Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army

Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION â€Å"Terrorism is the price of empire. If you do not wish to pay the price, you must give up the empire.† PAT BUCHANAN, Where the Right Went Wrong 1. Six decades after its independence Pakistan continues to search for a durable and credible identity. Pakistans rulers constantly strive to show how Pakistan is equal to, if not better than India in all respects. The complex psychology of the Pakistani ruling elite is dominated by the military. Even after more than three and a half decades, the role in the creation of Bangladesh continues to rankle, with the Pak Army in search of ‘revenge for its humiliating defeat in 1971. The mindset of the Pak Army is a cocktail of arrogance and brashness, at times bordering on cockiness, which becomes even more potent with the addition of a measure of a fundamentalism. 2. The Pak Army sees itself as the dominant power in Pakistan has always enjoyed a larger than life status in socio-political fabric of the country. Democratic regimes have not survived and people represented institutions remain weak in Pakistan. It is difficult to comment authoritatively on whether it is the weak political leadership which is responsible for the democratic failures or the overpowering army which has led to military coups in Pakistan. However, what is certain is this, whenever the position of Pak Army has got threatened they have managed to come back into focus as ‘saviours of the nation by destabilising the Indo-Pak relations. 3. The Pak Armys single minded pursuit of its proxy war for over a decade clearly indicates its long-term game planned to destabilize India by keeping the pot boiling in Kashmir, keeping the Indian Army and other security forces embroiled in counter insurgency operations and, more recently, to extend the area of engagement to other parts of India through wanton acts of terrorism in or around high value targets. In short the Pak Armys strategy is to bleed India through a thousand cuts. For Pak Army it is a win-win situation as there is an element of deniability about its involvement. The Pakistani Generals, are convinced that their bleed-India strategy is a low-cost, high pay off option for Pakistan and, therefore, they are loathe to give it up.[1] What Gives Pak Army Confidence to Wage Covert War? 4. A brutal confidence underlies Pakistans continuing commitment to a strategy of waging war by proxy. This confidence is founded on two pillars. The first is the belief in the Pakistan Armys ability to crush any insurgency if it really decides to do so. This conviction was expressed most clearly in General Pervez Musharrafs statement in 2005 to the insurgents in Balochistan that he would sort them out and that they wont know what hit them. 5. The second source of confidence is Pakistans nuclear weapons. Many in Pakistans army and political leadership believe that these weapons protect Pakistan from the outside world. Indian restraint during both the 1999 Kargil War and during the 2001-2002 OP PARAKRAM after the militant attack on Indias Parliament, is an evidence of the power of Pakistans nuclear card. This was evident again after the Mumbai attacks on 26 Nov 2008.[2] 6. Many—if not all—of the militant groups active in JK have enjoyed the specific patronage of the Pakistani state intelligence and military agencies to prosecute Islamabads interests in India.[3] 7. This dissertation seeks to carry out a study of the conduct of cross border terrorism by Pak Army, estimate its future contours suggest suitable responses. Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER II METHODOLOGY â€Å"Terrorism is the tactic of demanding the impossible, and demanding it at gunpoint.† CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, Terrorism: Notes Toward a Definition Statement of the Problem 1. To identify analyse role of Pak Army in creating dissonance in Indo- Pak relations by sponsoring cross border terrorism against India. To suggest Indias response to counter this threat. Hypothesis 2. With power now in hands of civilian establishment the Pak Army is finding itself in a vulnerable position and is gradually losing its commanding status. To regain their image as ‘guardian angels of the country they are resorting to destabilising Indo-Pak relations by triggering violent terror incidents. 3. The Pak Army attributes all such incidents as being carried out by ‘non-state actors and ‘freedom fighters, while the truth is that Pak Army along with ISI is directly involved in promoting cross border terrorism. Justification of the Study 4. Pak Army continues unabated in its quest to destabilise India through covert means. The investigations into the recent attacks in Mumbai have also revealed a clear link between the Pak Army and the non- state actors and yet the true propagators (read ISI) of the violence are yet to be brought to book. The more India talks in front of the whole world about it, the more denials come from Pakistan, in the light of these facts, it is essential that India must take concrete steps to counter Pak Army support to terrorists who wage covert war against India also unveil its true colours to the world community. Scope 5. The focus of this study is on Pak Armys use of radical Islamic Fundamentalism terrorism as a military strategy to create dissonance in Indo-Pak relations. The emphasis is on role of Pak Army in the recent Mumbai attacks. The study further analyses the likely contours of future covert war methods and concludes by suggesting various options with India to counter the new emerging threat. The dissertation does not cover Pak Army role in raising the ‘Taliban and its so called ongoing war against terrorism and only concentrate on the events and actions that destabilise Indo- Pak relations. Method of Data Collection 6. The source of this dissertation has been the books, periodicals and articles available in the library of Defence Services Staff College. The web sites of IDSA, USI, and several other Indian dailies on the Internet also have been a great help. The bibliography is appended at the end of the text. Organisation of study 7. It is proposed to study the subject by analysing and evaluating the following aspects:- (a) Understanding terrorism. (b) Cross Border Terrorism: An Alternative Military Strategy. (c) Pak Army Sponsored Cross Border Terrorism. (d) Future Contours Suggested Responses. (e) Conclusion. Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER III UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM â€Å"In an interconnected world, the defeat of international terrorism and most importantly, the prevention of these terrorist organizations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction will require the cooperation of many nations. We must always reserve the right to strike unilaterally at terrorists wherever they may exist. But we should know that our success in doing so is enhanced by engaging our allies so that we receive the crucial diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial support that can lighten our load and add legitimacy to our actions. This means talking to our friends and, at times, even our enemies.† BARACK OBAMA Defining Terrorism 1. Virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence perceived as directed against society—whether it involves the activities of antigovernment dissidents or governments themselves, organized-crime syndicates, common criminals, rioting mobs, people engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics, or lone extortionists—is often labeled â€Å"terrorism.† 2. Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, apolitical aim.[4] State Sponsored Terrorism 3. One of the most authoritative studies by Daniel Byman, a leading scholar on terrorism defines state sponsorship as â€Å"a governments intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain [its] organization.† [5]His research identifies six areas in which states provide support to terrorists—training and operations; money, arms, and logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological direction; and (perhaps most importantly) sanctuary.[6] Byman argues that terrorist groups which receive significant amounts of state support are far more difficult to counter and destroy than those which do not.[7] 4. However, it is also important to note that there are several types of state sponsorship of terrorism: â€Å"strong supporters† are states with both the desire and the capacity to support terrorist groups; â€Å"weak supporters† are those with the desire but not the capacity to offer significant support; â€Å"lukewarm supporters† are those that offer rhetorical but little actual tangible support; and â€Å"antagonistic supporters† are those that actually seek to control or even weaken the terrorist groups they appear to be supporting. Another category Byman examines is passive support, whereby states â€Å"deliberately turn a blind eye to the activities of terrorists in their countries but do not provide direct assistance.† [8] A states tolerance of or passivity toward a terrorist groups activities, he argues, is often as important to their success as any deliberate assistance they receive. Open and active state sponsorship of terrorism is rare, and it has decreased since the end of the Cold War. Yet this lack of open support does not necessarily diminish the important role that states play in fostering or hindering terrorism. 5. At times, the greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorists cause is by not policing a border, turning a blind eye to fundraising, or even Combating the Sources and Facilitators of Terrorism tolerating terrorist efforts to build their organizations, conduct operations, and survive. Passive support for terrorism can contribute to a terrorist groups success in several ways. It often allows a group to raise money, acquire arms, plan operations, and enjoy a respite from the counterattacks of the government it opposes. Passive support may also involve spreading an ideology that assists a terrorist group in its efforts to recruit new members.[9] Benefits to State Sponsored Terrorists 6. For the terrorist, the benefits of state sponsorship were even greater. Such a relationship appreciably enhanced the capabilities and operational capacity of otherwise limited terrorist groups, placing at their disposal the resources of an established nation-states entire diplomatic, military, and intelligence apparatus and thus greatly facilitating planning and intelligence. The logistical support provided by states assured the terrorists of otherwise unobtainable luxuries, such as the use of diplomatic pouches for the transport of weapons and explosives, false identification in the form of genuine passports, and the use of embassies and other diplomatic facilities as safe houses or staging bases. State sponsorship also afforded terrorists greater training opportunities; thus some groups were transformed into entities more akin to elite commando units than to the stereotypical conspiratorial cell of anarchists wielding Molotov cocktails or radicals manufacturing crude pipe bombs. Finally, terrorists were often paid handsomely for their services, turning hitherto financially destitute entities into well-endowed organizations with investment profiles and healthy balance sheets.[10] The Four Stages of Terrorism 7. The terrorist tactics though essentially focuses on creating terror through violence has evolved over a period of time. 1980s-1990s: Era of backyard Islamicist Struggles 8. During this time the focus was on overthrowing specific regions, like the non democratic governments of Algeria and Egypt, or fighting countries seen to be occupying Muslim lands like Israel and India. (a) Spectacular Example. Assassination of Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981 was probably the most famous terrorist act of this period. (b) Preferred Tactics. Mimicking the methods of secular left wing and nationalist terrorist groups like the Palestinian Fatah or the Irish Republican Army. This generally involved hijacking of aircraft, assassination of political s and kidnapping of foreigners. Few of these attacks had much of a ripple outside the region that they took place. These acts were largely seen as a local law and order issue rather than an international menace. 1990s- 2001: Rise of Spectacular Jihad 9. This period saw the arrival of Osama Bin Laden and the Egyptian Ayman al Zawahri on the scene. These men argued that local islamicist struggles need to combine force so they can replicate soviet defeat in Afghanistan. (a) Successful Attack. 9/11, the worlds most lethal and media-friendly terrorist attack. It was preceded by attacks on US warships and embassies in Africa and Persian gulf. (b) Preferred Tactics. 9/11 stamps suicide bombing as the preferred jihadi tactic but also raised the bar on how spectacular the attack must be From roughly 2002 onwards there was a huge surge in suicide bombings across the world, spreading into places like Kashmir, Chechnya and so on where they had previously been rare. 2001-2007: Maturing of Local Guerrilla Terrorism 10. Losing its Afghan base al Qaeda turned to local jihad affiliates to keep up the momentum of attack. Transit attacks in Madrid and London took place. But US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan provided a new outlet for jihadi wrath. Abu Musab al Zarqawi replaced Bin Laden as the terrorist of the moment. (a) Successful Attack. The entire campaign against US military in Iraq which soured the US public to the war and lead to a consensus on the need for the US to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible. (b) Preferred Tactics. In Europe it was bomb in the bus or terror on the train. In Iraq it is a more straight forward guerilla style war with roadside explosives devices, suicide bombers. Zarqawi introduced shocking media footage such as the execution video of Daniel Pearl. 2008: Possible start of Global Terrorism 11. Suicide Bombing hurts al Qaeda Sentiment among mainstream Islam. Surveys have shown declining support for such tactics since 2005 onwards. Further it is getting increasingly ineffective against new security methods and in terms of winning media attention. (a) Tactical Experiment. The use of small bands of suicide fighters, trained like professional soldiers, who simultaneously strike local and global targets. Mumbai is now being seen as the most intricately coordinated and most successful islamicist terrorist attack since 9/11. This could well be the dawn of new era of such terrorism. [11] Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER IV CROSS BORDER TERRORISM : AN ALTERNATIVE MILITARY STRATEGY â€Å"In the South Asian context, talks on conventional military confidence building cannot be divorced from terrorism. The route of the escalatory process is militancy.† BHARAT KARNAD 1. The Pakistani military leadership believes the terrorist threat is an incentive to India to come to the negotiating table; without it India will simply ignore Pakistans calls for a resolution of the issue. Terrorism also poisons Hindu-Muslim relations and weakens the foundations of Indias secularism. It affects the image of India as an investment destination, which would explain the terror attacks in cities like Bangalore and Mumbai. It panders to extremist lobbies within Pakistan whose declared ambition is to break up India from within. The repeated attacks on Hindu religious places is intended to provoke a communal backlash against the Muslims, in the expectation that this will engender greater Muslim alienation, leading eventually to the tearing up of the social fabric of India.[12] 2. Terrorism has become an institution in Pakistan and has widespread support. Its army and intelligence services consider it a strategic weapon. After each terrorist strike, the Pakistani government cleverly dodges international pressure by temporarily clamping down on terrorism until the focus shifts away. It never completely eliminates this menace.[13] 3. Post Mumbai, Ironic as it may seem the Pakistan Army has gained in an important way. The crisis has gone some way in building bridges between the militant groups and the Pakistan military. Their historical relationship, which had broken down in several ways, is on the mend. Taliban groups in the tribal areas battling Pakistani security forces offered ceasefires so that troops could devote all their energies on what was built up as a coming war on the eastern front. They even offered to fight alongside the troops against India. [14] Cost to Pakistan to Support Cross Border Terrorism 4. Pakistan officially accepts that it is providing diplomatic, political and moral support to Kashmiri militants. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan army and the ISI Directorate are providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the militants, besides financial support. The ISI spends approximately Rs 5 Crore per month for its proxy war campaign. The Pakistan Army also actively assists the militants to infiltrate into jK by engaging Indian posts on the LC along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fireand provides a large number of officers to lead the militants.[15] The Pak ‘Terror Machine 5. How did the present day terror infrastructure originate? The answer this question can be found in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion provided Pakistan Army an opportunity to reconstruct its professional image which had considerably tarnished as a consequence of 1971 war and dismemberment of Pakistan. In 1981, when the Reagan administration agreed to support the Afghan Mujahideen and US military assistance to Pakistan began to filter in. It helped the military to build its professional image. The planning and coordination of Afghan resistance movement was done in close collaboration with US intelligence agencies and the Inter Service Intelligence(ISI) of Pakistan. While supporting, training and organizing the various Afghan Guerrilla Bands the ISI built its reputation and skills as a professional organisation. In the process, the ISI enhanced its intelligence and surveillance capabilities. The Zia regime at that time also availed this opportunity to embark on a program to modernize the armed forces of Pakistan. The regime was able to strike a deal with Reagan administration for the procurement of sophisticated F-16 fighter planes. It was also able to procure some artillery and armoured equipment for the army. Consequently the Afghan war and US military aid did facilitate the moderenisation of the Pakistan military. This helped the Military to bolster its professional image.[16] 6. Neither the Americans, stung and exhausted after the wars of the CIA and the armed forces in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, nor the Saudis, who hate to get involved in fighting anywhere, wanted to commit their own forces. So they let Pakistans ISI do the donkey work. The ISI, controlled directly by President Zia al-Haq and influenced on the ground by affluent Arab organizations close to the Muslim Brothers and Pakistans Islamist groups, ran the war against the Russians. Many billions of dollars to fund it came from the United States, the Saudi treasury, and finally as the conflict was winding down, from the resources of financiers like the Saudi construction tycoon Osama bin Laden, who effectively privatized global terrorism in the 1990s.[17] 7. The fundamentalist groups which were trained initially for Afghan war were indoctrinated to believe that it is their religious duty to kill unbelievers and their supporters wherever they are found. Funded by the ISI and religion- based political parties of Pakistan, they are armed with sophisticated weaponery.[18] It is well known that the ISI had surreptitiously siphoned off up to 40-50 % of the weapons supplied by the CIA for use by the Afghan Mujahideen against Russia. These weapons have eventually found their way into JK.[19] It is not as well known that towards the end of Afghan resistance against Russian occupation, ‘mullah warlords had taken over the cultivation and processing of poppy along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Since then, the illicit trade in narcotics has been generating hefty profits. These are being ploughed into fuelling terrorism in JK and in supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. This vicious politician-mulla-ISI-army racket suited the ruling elite in Pakistan and is a major cause of continuing war in Afghanistan and terrorism in Kashmir.[20] 8. The sketch below shows the movement of CIA/ISI trained guerrillas out of Afghanistan after driving out Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Islamic Fundamentalism Pak Army 9. From the early days, the secular apolitical army that the British left behind deviated in Pakistan from the basic tenets of professionalism and began to intervene in politics and governance aided by the bureaucratic class( later to be simply used by the army) and the incompetence of the political elites. The army defined the parameters of national policy and the means by which it was to be pursued even when it was not in direct control of state. It also began from the very beginning to rely on clandestine covert war, executed through multiple means and tactics, while following up with traditional professional military forces for a coup de grace when it wanted.[21] 10. When General Zia ul Haq came to power he did not take too long to reveal his religious political outlook. He was brisk in replacing the Jinnahs motto of Pakistan Army- Unity, Faith Discipline with Faith, Piety Holy War (Jihad).[22] In his opening speech, after the take over he, extended two reasons for military intervention. Firstly the country was on threshold of a civil war. Secondly Islam had not been effectively put into practice in Pakistani society.[23] Zia ul Haq after assuming power lent his support and affinity with the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) protest movement. PNA was an alliance of nine parties to throw out Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and they promised to bring back Islamic laws. â€Å"I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essentia l pre-requisite for the country.†[24] 11. The army has seen itself for the last three decades or more as the defender of not only of the physical frontiers but also of ideological frontiers of the state, conceptualized on the foundations of exclusivity of religion. It has inevitably been increasingly ‘islamised which at one level enhanced internal cohesion and motivation to fight and at another created a spectre of potential discord within the army.[25] 12. In 1976, the Pakistan army had amended its secular motto to include the term ‘jihad in it. All the eight groups of irregular resistance fighters that it equipped and trained for the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s were called ‘Mujahideen- those who carry out jihad.[26] The military-dominated state has used jihad, which is intrinsic to faith and ethics in Islam, to advance its strategic, economic, and political ends. Such a shrewd strategic vision, backed by political denial and policies of economic exclusion, violates elementary Islamic principles of equity and justice. The army has capitalised on the jehadi industry to further ensconce itself in the power structure.[27] Role of ISI 13. The Inter Services Intelligence(ISI) of Pakistan and the inter services public relations are officially under the ministry of defence. In reality, the ISI functions under direct control of Pak Army and its Chief is answerable to the military leaders. The ISI does not report to the civilian authority, even when there is a democratically elected government. The ISI enjoys a unique status in the infrastructure of the Pakistani establishment. It is not an ordinary intelligence apparatus of the state. It has emerged as a fulcrum of Islamic jihadist operations of the state of Pakistan and jihadist tanzeems created by the state. 14. The ISI devoted two full wings of its establishment for carrying out operations inside India. The joint intelligence miscellaneous (JIM) and the joint intelligence north (JIN) are reported to be responsible for directing the Indian operations of the ISI. Whole other wings of the ISI are known to play supportive roles. The JIX often came to the notice of the Indian agencies for coordinating special operations inside India. The Pakistan IB, unlike Indian IB, is not totally barred from conducting operations in selected foreign countries. For Indian targets they are allowed to conduct certain shallow penetration trans-border operations as well as assigned high commission based operations.[28] The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and ISI 15. The Lashkars nexus with the ISI is well established. â€Å"LeT had worked in close coordination with the ISI, which also provided support to launch the militants across the border† Dr. Khalid Mehmood Soomroo of the Jamiat-e-Islam asks: â€Å"Is there a single militant training centre in Pakistan which can operate without the consent of the Pakistan army?† The are numerous training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). Zahab and Roy mention three, the principal one being Um al-Qura at Muzaffarabad. Five hundred mujahids are trained here every month.[29] Moreover, India has been victimized by a host of militant groups based in and supported by Pakistan for decades. With the possible exception of the militant groups associated with Jamaat-Islami, the so-called Kashmir tanzeems have been raised, nurtured, assisted, and trained by the ISI.[30] As such, these groups are not strictly non state actors but rather extensions of the state intelligence apparatus, albeit wit h some degree of plausible deniability. 16. Groups that were previously limited to the Kashmir expanded into the Indian hinterland following the 1998 nuclear tests. Notable attacks included the 2000 LeT attack on the Red Fort, the 2001 Jaish-e-Muhamad (JeM) attack on the Indian parliament, the 2006 LeT Mumbai rail system attack, and numerous other attacks by LeT or JeM throughout India. In addition, in 2000, LeT introduced the fidayeen (high-risk suicide commando) operation in Kashmir and has since used it throughout India.[31] 17. LeT is still considered to be an important asset in Pakistans quest to secure its regional objectives and because it, unlike the proliferating morass of Deobandi groups, has never targeted the state.[32] Civil-Military Power Relationship in Pakistan 18. As a ruler Zia left Pakistan turbulent and rife with sectarian and ethnic tensions. Political parties were weak and divided. In such a divided polity the military was not merely the hegemonic, but also the only institution that had grown, expanded and emerged as the arbitrator in defining power relations among various contending power groups. Having established its hegemony in political system the military was poised to search for redefining its role in the post Zia era.[33] Military Hegemony has emerged as the most dominant and durable character of Pakistans political system. Hegemony was achieved through four process (a) Promotion of the â€Å"corporate interests† of military. (b) Political exclusion i.e. exclusion of political leaders, political parties and urban middle class. (c) Political control, i.e. control of the press and labour. (d) Political inclusion, i.e. co-optation and consolidation of bureaucratic elites, financial industrial groups and feudal classes.[34] Govt and Pak Army Today 19.Fast forward to the present and today as a result of the tumultuous political developments in Pakistan during 2007-08 leading to the historic 2008 elections, the Pak Army is under pressure but has not lost its power. It may go back to its old ways when the situation calms down. Pakistan is still far from having a genuinely democratic government that wields effective power. A tug-of-war is underway. It is not ruled out that spate of terrorist acts and destructive activities against india are intended to show up the ineffectiveness of the Pakistans civilian government and create suspicions in India about its bonafides, and the way for the Pak Army to reassert itself openly in Pakistans political arena[35] 20. While Musharrafs departure has reduced the visible level of involvement of the Pakistan Army in affairs of state, it has by no means reduced its stature as a major domestic force and one of the key pillars of governance in the country. It can safely be expected that the weakness and instability of the political coalition will bestow greater significance on the domestic role of the Pakistan Army and could even see the coalition in Islamabad acceding to all â€Å"requests† of the Pakistan Army. The chance that any reluctance on the part of the elected politicians to digress from the path desired by the Pakistan Army may lead to yet another military coup in Pakistan is likely to prominently in the thinking of the elected leaders and could well force them to acquiesce to the desires of the Pakistan Army. In some ways, this would highlight a paradox that has continued to in Pakistani politics the departure of a strong albeit despised military ruler from the corridors of power has once again presented the all-powerful Pakistan Army with yet another opportunity for calling the shots in Islamabad. The power and influence that the Pakistan Army continues to enjoy became fairly evident when Prime Minister Gillanis government had to revoke an order placing the powerful ISI under the Ministry of Interior within six hours of its issuance, primarily due to pressure from the Army.[36] Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER V PAK ARMY SPONSORED CROSS BORDER TERRORISM â€Å"The terrible thing about terrorism is that ultimately it destroys those who practise it. Slowly but surely, as they try to extinguish life in others, the light within them dies.† TERRY WAITE, London Guardian, Feb. 20, 1992 1. The Pak Army is now inextricably involved in exporting terrorism to India. A cosy relationship has developed at the functional level between the local army commanders, the drug mafia, the politicians, the bureaucrats, the police, and the mullahs who supply young recruits as cannon fodder for the so called jihad in Kashmir. It suits everyones vested interests to keep the pot boiling. The vigorous advocacy of jihad provides a share in spoils of the narcotics booty. Power and pelf make a potent cocktail; this heady mixture is an extremely motivating incentive for institutionalizing the perpetuation of a proxy war against India. Hence, no matter what incentives India offers, there is likely to be no let up in the ongoing hostilities. [37] Pak Sponsored Terrorism in JK 2. The ISI had initiated the Proxy war in JK in 1989-90. This campaign can be categorized in three main phases (a) The Azadi Phase (1990-1995). The ISI had raised, tr Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION â€Å"Terrorism is the price of empire. If you do not wish to pay the price, you must give up the empire.† PAT BUCHANAN, Where the Right Went Wrong 1. Six decades after its independence Pakistan continues to search for a durable and credible identity. Pakistans rulers constantly strive to show how Pakistan is equal to, if not better than India in all respects. The complex psychology of the Pakistani ruling elite is dominated by the military. Even after more than three and a half decades, the role in the creation of Bangladesh continues to rankle, with the Pak Army in search of ‘revenge for its humiliating defeat in 1971. The mindset of the Pak Army is a cocktail of arrogance and brashness, at times bordering on cockiness, which becomes even more potent with the addition of a measure of a fundamentalism. 2. The Pak Army sees itself as the dominant power in Pakistan has always enjoyed a larger than life status in socio-political fabric of the country. Democratic regimes have not survived and people represented institutions remain weak in Pakistan. It is difficult to comment authoritatively on whether it is the weak political leadership which is responsible for the democratic failures or the overpowering army which has led to military coups in Pakistan. However, what is certain is this, whenever the position of Pak Army has got threatened they have managed to come back into focus as ‘saviours of the nation by destabilising the Indo-Pak relations. 3. The Pak Armys single minded pursuit of its proxy war for over a decade clearly indicates its long-term game planned to destabilize India by keeping the pot boiling in Kashmir, keeping the Indian Army and other security forces embroiled in counter insurgency operations and, more recently, to extend the area of engagement to other parts of India through wanton acts of terrorism in or around high value targets. In short the Pak Armys strategy is to bleed India through a thousand cuts. For Pak Army it is a win-win situation as there is an element of deniability about its involvement. The Pakistani Generals, are convinced that their bleed-India strategy is a low-cost, high pay off option for Pakistan and, therefore, they are loathe to give it up.[1] What Gives Pak Army Confidence to Wage Covert War? 4. A brutal confidence underlies Pakistans continuing commitment to a strategy of waging war by proxy. This confidence is founded on two pillars. The first is the belief in the Pakistan Armys ability to crush any insurgency if it really decides to do so. This conviction was expressed most clearly in General Pervez Musharrafs statement in 2005 to the insurgents in Balochistan that he would sort them out and that they wont know what hit them. 5. The second source of confidence is Pakistans nuclear weapons. Many in Pakistans army and political leadership believe that these weapons protect Pakistan from the outside world. Indian restraint during both the 1999 Kargil War and during the 2001-2002 OP PARAKRAM after the militant attack on Indias Parliament, is an evidence of the power of Pakistans nuclear card. This was evident again after the Mumbai attacks on 26 Nov 2008.[2] 6. Many—if not all—of the militant groups active in JK have enjoyed the specific patronage of the Pakistani state intelligence and military agencies to prosecute Islamabads interests in India.[3] 7. This dissertation seeks to carry out a study of the conduct of cross border terrorism by Pak Army, estimate its future contours suggest suitable responses. Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER II METHODOLOGY â€Å"Terrorism is the tactic of demanding the impossible, and demanding it at gunpoint.† CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, Terrorism: Notes Toward a Definition Statement of the Problem 1. To identify analyse role of Pak Army in creating dissonance in Indo- Pak relations by sponsoring cross border terrorism against India. To suggest Indias response to counter this threat. Hypothesis 2. With power now in hands of civilian establishment the Pak Army is finding itself in a vulnerable position and is gradually losing its commanding status. To regain their image as ‘guardian angels of the country they are resorting to destabilising Indo-Pak relations by triggering violent terror incidents. 3. The Pak Army attributes all such incidents as being carried out by ‘non-state actors and ‘freedom fighters, while the truth is that Pak Army along with ISI is directly involved in promoting cross border terrorism. Justification of the Study 4. Pak Army continues unabated in its quest to destabilise India through covert means. The investigations into the recent attacks in Mumbai have also revealed a clear link between the Pak Army and the non- state actors and yet the true propagators (read ISI) of the violence are yet to be brought to book. The more India talks in front of the whole world about it, the more denials come from Pakistan, in the light of these facts, it is essential that India must take concrete steps to counter Pak Army support to terrorists who wage covert war against India also unveil its true colours to the world community. Scope 5. The focus of this study is on Pak Armys use of radical Islamic Fundamentalism terrorism as a military strategy to create dissonance in Indo-Pak relations. The emphasis is on role of Pak Army in the recent Mumbai attacks. The study further analyses the likely contours of future covert war methods and concludes by suggesting various options with India to counter the new emerging threat. The dissertation does not cover Pak Army role in raising the ‘Taliban and its so called ongoing war against terrorism and only concentrate on the events and actions that destabilise Indo- Pak relations. Method of Data Collection 6. The source of this dissertation has been the books, periodicals and articles available in the library of Defence Services Staff College. The web sites of IDSA, USI, and several other Indian dailies on the Internet also have been a great help. The bibliography is appended at the end of the text. Organisation of study 7. It is proposed to study the subject by analysing and evaluating the following aspects:- (a) Understanding terrorism. (b) Cross Border Terrorism: An Alternative Military Strategy. (c) Pak Army Sponsored Cross Border Terrorism. (d) Future Contours Suggested Responses. (e) Conclusion. Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER III UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM â€Å"In an interconnected world, the defeat of international terrorism and most importantly, the prevention of these terrorist organizations from obtaining weapons of mass destruction will require the cooperation of many nations. We must always reserve the right to strike unilaterally at terrorists wherever they may exist. But we should know that our success in doing so is enhanced by engaging our allies so that we receive the crucial diplomatic, military, intelligence, and financial support that can lighten our load and add legitimacy to our actions. This means talking to our friends and, at times, even our enemies.† BARACK OBAMA Defining Terrorism 1. Virtually any especially abhorrent act of violence perceived as directed against society—whether it involves the activities of antigovernment dissidents or governments themselves, organized-crime syndicates, common criminals, rioting mobs, people engaged in militant protest, individual psychotics, or lone extortionists—is often labeled â€Å"terrorism.† 2. Terrorism, in the most widely accepted contemporary usage of the term, is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. Terrorism is thus violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in service of, apolitical aim.[4] State Sponsored Terrorism 3. One of the most authoritative studies by Daniel Byman, a leading scholar on terrorism defines state sponsorship as â€Å"a governments intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain [its] organization.† [5]His research identifies six areas in which states provide support to terrorists—training and operations; money, arms, and logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological direction; and (perhaps most importantly) sanctuary.[6] Byman argues that terrorist groups which receive significant amounts of state support are far more difficult to counter and destroy than those which do not.[7] 4. However, it is also important to note that there are several types of state sponsorship of terrorism: â€Å"strong supporters† are states with both the desire and the capacity to support terrorist groups; â€Å"weak supporters† are those with the desire but not the capacity to offer significant support; â€Å"lukewarm supporters† are those that offer rhetorical but little actual tangible support; and â€Å"antagonistic supporters† are those that actually seek to control or even weaken the terrorist groups they appear to be supporting. Another category Byman examines is passive support, whereby states â€Å"deliberately turn a blind eye to the activities of terrorists in their countries but do not provide direct assistance.† [8] A states tolerance of or passivity toward a terrorist groups activities, he argues, is often as important to their success as any deliberate assistance they receive. Open and active state sponsorship of terrorism is rare, and it has decreased since the end of the Cold War. Yet this lack of open support does not necessarily diminish the important role that states play in fostering or hindering terrorism. 5. At times, the greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorists cause is by not policing a border, turning a blind eye to fundraising, or even Combating the Sources and Facilitators of Terrorism tolerating terrorist efforts to build their organizations, conduct operations, and survive. Passive support for terrorism can contribute to a terrorist groups success in several ways. It often allows a group to raise money, acquire arms, plan operations, and enjoy a respite from the counterattacks of the government it opposes. Passive support may also involve spreading an ideology that assists a terrorist group in its efforts to recruit new members.[9] Benefits to State Sponsored Terrorists 6. For the terrorist, the benefits of state sponsorship were even greater. Such a relationship appreciably enhanced the capabilities and operational capacity of otherwise limited terrorist groups, placing at their disposal the resources of an established nation-states entire diplomatic, military, and intelligence apparatus and thus greatly facilitating planning and intelligence. The logistical support provided by states assured the terrorists of otherwise unobtainable luxuries, such as the use of diplomatic pouches for the transport of weapons and explosives, false identification in the form of genuine passports, and the use of embassies and other diplomatic facilities as safe houses or staging bases. State sponsorship also afforded terrorists greater training opportunities; thus some groups were transformed into entities more akin to elite commando units than to the stereotypical conspiratorial cell of anarchists wielding Molotov cocktails or radicals manufacturing crude pipe bombs. Finally, terrorists were often paid handsomely for their services, turning hitherto financially destitute entities into well-endowed organizations with investment profiles and healthy balance sheets.[10] The Four Stages of Terrorism 7. The terrorist tactics though essentially focuses on creating terror through violence has evolved over a period of time. 1980s-1990s: Era of backyard Islamicist Struggles 8. During this time the focus was on overthrowing specific regions, like the non democratic governments of Algeria and Egypt, or fighting countries seen to be occupying Muslim lands like Israel and India. (a) Spectacular Example. Assassination of Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1981 was probably the most famous terrorist act of this period. (b) Preferred Tactics. Mimicking the methods of secular left wing and nationalist terrorist groups like the Palestinian Fatah or the Irish Republican Army. This generally involved hijacking of aircraft, assassination of political s and kidnapping of foreigners. Few of these attacks had much of a ripple outside the region that they took place. These acts were largely seen as a local law and order issue rather than an international menace. 1990s- 2001: Rise of Spectacular Jihad 9. This period saw the arrival of Osama Bin Laden and the Egyptian Ayman al Zawahri on the scene. These men argued that local islamicist struggles need to combine force so they can replicate soviet defeat in Afghanistan. (a) Successful Attack. 9/11, the worlds most lethal and media-friendly terrorist attack. It was preceded by attacks on US warships and embassies in Africa and Persian gulf. (b) Preferred Tactics. 9/11 stamps suicide bombing as the preferred jihadi tactic but also raised the bar on how spectacular the attack must be From roughly 2002 onwards there was a huge surge in suicide bombings across the world, spreading into places like Kashmir, Chechnya and so on where they had previously been rare. 2001-2007: Maturing of Local Guerrilla Terrorism 10. Losing its Afghan base al Qaeda turned to local jihad affiliates to keep up the momentum of attack. Transit attacks in Madrid and London took place. But US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan provided a new outlet for jihadi wrath. Abu Musab al Zarqawi replaced Bin Laden as the terrorist of the moment. (a) Successful Attack. The entire campaign against US military in Iraq which soured the US public to the war and lead to a consensus on the need for the US to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible. (b) Preferred Tactics. In Europe it was bomb in the bus or terror on the train. In Iraq it is a more straight forward guerilla style war with roadside explosives devices, suicide bombers. Zarqawi introduced shocking media footage such as the execution video of Daniel Pearl. 2008: Possible start of Global Terrorism 11. Suicide Bombing hurts al Qaeda Sentiment among mainstream Islam. Surveys have shown declining support for such tactics since 2005 onwards. Further it is getting increasingly ineffective against new security methods and in terms of winning media attention. (a) Tactical Experiment. The use of small bands of suicide fighters, trained like professional soldiers, who simultaneously strike local and global targets. Mumbai is now being seen as the most intricately coordinated and most successful islamicist terrorist attack since 9/11. This could well be the dawn of new era of such terrorism. [11] Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER IV CROSS BORDER TERRORISM : AN ALTERNATIVE MILITARY STRATEGY â€Å"In the South Asian context, talks on conventional military confidence building cannot be divorced from terrorism. The route of the escalatory process is militancy.† BHARAT KARNAD 1. The Pakistani military leadership believes the terrorist threat is an incentive to India to come to the negotiating table; without it India will simply ignore Pakistans calls for a resolution of the issue. Terrorism also poisons Hindu-Muslim relations and weakens the foundations of Indias secularism. It affects the image of India as an investment destination, which would explain the terror attacks in cities like Bangalore and Mumbai. It panders to extremist lobbies within Pakistan whose declared ambition is to break up India from within. The repeated attacks on Hindu religious places is intended to provoke a communal backlash against the Muslims, in the expectation that this will engender greater Muslim alienation, leading eventually to the tearing up of the social fabric of India.[12] 2. Terrorism has become an institution in Pakistan and has widespread support. Its army and intelligence services consider it a strategic weapon. After each terrorist strike, the Pakistani government cleverly dodges international pressure by temporarily clamping down on terrorism until the focus shifts away. It never completely eliminates this menace.[13] 3. Post Mumbai, Ironic as it may seem the Pakistan Army has gained in an important way. The crisis has gone some way in building bridges between the militant groups and the Pakistan military. Their historical relationship, which had broken down in several ways, is on the mend. Taliban groups in the tribal areas battling Pakistani security forces offered ceasefires so that troops could devote all their energies on what was built up as a coming war on the eastern front. They even offered to fight alongside the troops against India. [14] Cost to Pakistan to Support Cross Border Terrorism 4. Pakistan officially accepts that it is providing diplomatic, political and moral support to Kashmiri militants. However, it is now internationally accepted that the Pakistan army and the ISI Directorate are providing military training, weapons, military equipment, ammunition and explosives to the militants, besides financial support. The ISI spends approximately Rs 5 Crore per month for its proxy war campaign. The Pakistan Army also actively assists the militants to infiltrate into jK by engaging Indian posts on the LC along the routes of infiltration with artillery and small arms fireand provides a large number of officers to lead the militants.[15] The Pak ‘Terror Machine 5. How did the present day terror infrastructure originate? The answer this question can be found in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The invasion provided Pakistan Army an opportunity to reconstruct its professional image which had considerably tarnished as a consequence of 1971 war and dismemberment of Pakistan. In 1981, when the Reagan administration agreed to support the Afghan Mujahideen and US military assistance to Pakistan began to filter in. It helped the military to build its professional image. The planning and coordination of Afghan resistance movement was done in close collaboration with US intelligence agencies and the Inter Service Intelligence(ISI) of Pakistan. While supporting, training and organizing the various Afghan Guerrilla Bands the ISI built its reputation and skills as a professional organisation. In the process, the ISI enhanced its intelligence and surveillance capabilities. The Zia regime at that time also availed this opportunity to embark on a program to modernize the armed forces of Pakistan. The regime was able to strike a deal with Reagan administration for the procurement of sophisticated F-16 fighter planes. It was also able to procure some artillery and armoured equipment for the army. Consequently the Afghan war and US military aid did facilitate the moderenisation of the Pakistan military. This helped the Military to bolster its professional image.[16] 6. Neither the Americans, stung and exhausted after the wars of the CIA and the armed forces in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, nor the Saudis, who hate to get involved in fighting anywhere, wanted to commit their own forces. So they let Pakistans ISI do the donkey work. The ISI, controlled directly by President Zia al-Haq and influenced on the ground by affluent Arab organizations close to the Muslim Brothers and Pakistans Islamist groups, ran the war against the Russians. Many billions of dollars to fund it came from the United States, the Saudi treasury, and finally as the conflict was winding down, from the resources of financiers like the Saudi construction tycoon Osama bin Laden, who effectively privatized global terrorism in the 1990s.[17] 7. The fundamentalist groups which were trained initially for Afghan war were indoctrinated to believe that it is their religious duty to kill unbelievers and their supporters wherever they are found. Funded by the ISI and religion- based political parties of Pakistan, they are armed with sophisticated weaponery.[18] It is well known that the ISI had surreptitiously siphoned off up to 40-50 % of the weapons supplied by the CIA for use by the Afghan Mujahideen against Russia. These weapons have eventually found their way into JK.[19] It is not as well known that towards the end of Afghan resistance against Russian occupation, ‘mullah warlords had taken over the cultivation and processing of poppy along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Since then, the illicit trade in narcotics has been generating hefty profits. These are being ploughed into fuelling terrorism in JK and in supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. This vicious politician-mulla-ISI-army racket suited the ruling elite in Pakistan and is a major cause of continuing war in Afghanistan and terrorism in Kashmir.[20] 8. The sketch below shows the movement of CIA/ISI trained guerrillas out of Afghanistan after driving out Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Islamic Fundamentalism Pak Army 9. From the early days, the secular apolitical army that the British left behind deviated in Pakistan from the basic tenets of professionalism and began to intervene in politics and governance aided by the bureaucratic class( later to be simply used by the army) and the incompetence of the political elites. The army defined the parameters of national policy and the means by which it was to be pursued even when it was not in direct control of state. It also began from the very beginning to rely on clandestine covert war, executed through multiple means and tactics, while following up with traditional professional military forces for a coup de grace when it wanted.[21] 10. When General Zia ul Haq came to power he did not take too long to reveal his religious political outlook. He was brisk in replacing the Jinnahs motto of Pakistan Army- Unity, Faith Discipline with Faith, Piety Holy War (Jihad).[22] In his opening speech, after the take over he, extended two reasons for military intervention. Firstly the country was on threshold of a civil war. Secondly Islam had not been effectively put into practice in Pakistani society.[23] Zia ul Haq after assuming power lent his support and affinity with the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) protest movement. PNA was an alliance of nine parties to throw out Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and they promised to bring back Islamic laws. â€Å"I must say that the spirit of Islam, demonstrated during the recent movement was commendable. It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essentia l pre-requisite for the country.†[24] 11. The army has seen itself for the last three decades or more as the defender of not only of the physical frontiers but also of ideological frontiers of the state, conceptualized on the foundations of exclusivity of religion. It has inevitably been increasingly ‘islamised which at one level enhanced internal cohesion and motivation to fight and at another created a spectre of potential discord within the army.[25] 12. In 1976, the Pakistan army had amended its secular motto to include the term ‘jihad in it. All the eight groups of irregular resistance fighters that it equipped and trained for the war in Afghanistan during the 1980s were called ‘Mujahideen- those who carry out jihad.[26] The military-dominated state has used jihad, which is intrinsic to faith and ethics in Islam, to advance its strategic, economic, and political ends. Such a shrewd strategic vision, backed by political denial and policies of economic exclusion, violates elementary Islamic principles of equity and justice. The army has capitalised on the jehadi industry to further ensconce itself in the power structure.[27] Role of ISI 13. The Inter Services Intelligence(ISI) of Pakistan and the inter services public relations are officially under the ministry of defence. In reality, the ISI functions under direct control of Pak Army and its Chief is answerable to the military leaders. The ISI does not report to the civilian authority, even when there is a democratically elected government. The ISI enjoys a unique status in the infrastructure of the Pakistani establishment. It is not an ordinary intelligence apparatus of the state. It has emerged as a fulcrum of Islamic jihadist operations of the state of Pakistan and jihadist tanzeems created by the state. 14. The ISI devoted two full wings of its establishment for carrying out operations inside India. The joint intelligence miscellaneous (JIM) and the joint intelligence north (JIN) are reported to be responsible for directing the Indian operations of the ISI. Whole other wings of the ISI are known to play supportive roles. The JIX often came to the notice of the Indian agencies for coordinating special operations inside India. The Pakistan IB, unlike Indian IB, is not totally barred from conducting operations in selected foreign countries. For Indian targets they are allowed to conduct certain shallow penetration trans-border operations as well as assigned high commission based operations.[28] The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and ISI 15. The Lashkars nexus with the ISI is well established. â€Å"LeT had worked in close coordination with the ISI, which also provided support to launch the militants across the border† Dr. Khalid Mehmood Soomroo of the Jamiat-e-Islam asks: â€Å"Is there a single militant training centre in Pakistan which can operate without the consent of the Pakistan army?† The are numerous training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK). Zahab and Roy mention three, the principal one being Um al-Qura at Muzaffarabad. Five hundred mujahids are trained here every month.[29] Moreover, India has been victimized by a host of militant groups based in and supported by Pakistan for decades. With the possible exception of the militant groups associated with Jamaat-Islami, the so-called Kashmir tanzeems have been raised, nurtured, assisted, and trained by the ISI.[30] As such, these groups are not strictly non state actors but rather extensions of the state intelligence apparatus, albeit wit h some degree of plausible deniability. 16. Groups that were previously limited to the Kashmir expanded into the Indian hinterland following the 1998 nuclear tests. Notable attacks included the 2000 LeT attack on the Red Fort, the 2001 Jaish-e-Muhamad (JeM) attack on the Indian parliament, the 2006 LeT Mumbai rail system attack, and numerous other attacks by LeT or JeM throughout India. In addition, in 2000, LeT introduced the fidayeen (high-risk suicide commando) operation in Kashmir and has since used it throughout India.[31] 17. LeT is still considered to be an important asset in Pakistans quest to secure its regional objectives and because it, unlike the proliferating morass of Deobandi groups, has never targeted the state.[32] Civil-Military Power Relationship in Pakistan 18. As a ruler Zia left Pakistan turbulent and rife with sectarian and ethnic tensions. Political parties were weak and divided. In such a divided polity the military was not merely the hegemonic, but also the only institution that had grown, expanded and emerged as the arbitrator in defining power relations among various contending power groups. Having established its hegemony in political system the military was poised to search for redefining its role in the post Zia era.[33] Military Hegemony has emerged as the most dominant and durable character of Pakistans political system. Hegemony was achieved through four process (a) Promotion of the â€Å"corporate interests† of military. (b) Political exclusion i.e. exclusion of political leaders, political parties and urban middle class. (c) Political control, i.e. control of the press and labour. (d) Political inclusion, i.e. co-optation and consolidation of bureaucratic elites, financial industrial groups and feudal classes.[34] Govt and Pak Army Today 19.Fast forward to the present and today as a result of the tumultuous political developments in Pakistan during 2007-08 leading to the historic 2008 elections, the Pak Army is under pressure but has not lost its power. It may go back to its old ways when the situation calms down. Pakistan is still far from having a genuinely democratic government that wields effective power. A tug-of-war is underway. It is not ruled out that spate of terrorist acts and destructive activities against india are intended to show up the ineffectiveness of the Pakistans civilian government and create suspicions in India about its bonafides, and the way for the Pak Army to reassert itself openly in Pakistans political arena[35] 20. While Musharrafs departure has reduced the visible level of involvement of the Pakistan Army in affairs of state, it has by no means reduced its stature as a major domestic force and one of the key pillars of governance in the country. It can safely be expected that the weakness and instability of the political coalition will bestow greater significance on the domestic role of the Pakistan Army and could even see the coalition in Islamabad acceding to all â€Å"requests† of the Pakistan Army. The chance that any reluctance on the part of the elected politicians to digress from the path desired by the Pakistan Army may lead to yet another military coup in Pakistan is likely to prominently in the thinking of the elected leaders and could well force them to acquiesce to the desires of the Pakistan Army. In some ways, this would highlight a paradox that has continued to in Pakistani politics the departure of a strong albeit despised military ruler from the corridors of power has once again presented the all-powerful Pakistan Army with yet another opportunity for calling the shots in Islamabad. The power and influence that the Pakistan Army continues to enjoy became fairly evident when Prime Minister Gillanis government had to revoke an order placing the powerful ISI under the Ministry of Interior within six hours of its issuance, primarily due to pressure from the Army.[36] Cross Border Terrorism Sponsored by Pak Army and Suggested Indian response CHAPTER V PAK ARMY SPONSORED CROSS BORDER TERRORISM â€Å"The terrible thing about terrorism is that ultimately it destroys those who practise it. Slowly but surely, as they try to extinguish life in others, the light within them dies.† TERRY WAITE, London Guardian, Feb. 20, 1992 1. The Pak Army is now inextricably involved in exporting terrorism to India. A cosy relationship has developed at the functional level between the local army commanders, the drug mafia, the politicians, the bureaucrats, the police, and the mullahs who supply young recruits as cannon fodder for the so called jihad in Kashmir. It suits everyones vested interests to keep the pot boiling. The vigorous advocacy of jihad provides a share in spoils of the narcotics booty. Power and pelf make a potent cocktail; this heady mixture is an extremely motivating incentive for institutionalizing the perpetuation of a proxy war against India. Hence, no matter what incentives India offers, there is likely to be no let up in the ongoing hostilities. [37] Pak Sponsored Terrorism in JK 2. The ISI had initiated the Proxy war in JK in 1989-90. This campaign can be categorized in three main phases (a) The Azadi Phase (1990-1995). The ISI had raised, tr